Medical practice, particularly in the context of procedural medicine, is well understood to involve risk. Whenever a patient undergoes a procedure, it is accepted that the patient or patient's guardian consents where possible to the procedure and the potential complications, whether expected or unexpected. The method of informed consent in Australia is based on ethical and legal principles and continues to evolve. We describe a recent case of a patient who developed peripheral nerve injury as a result of periprocedural positioning. The court's ruling in the case-that a failure to warn of a particular risk that would have prevented a patient from undergoing a procedure but did not occur will not necessarily result in a finding of negligence in relation to another risk where harm did occur-represents a development in the principles of informed consent central to clinical practice. The relevance of this ruling will be discussed in the context of clinicians' ongoing duties to comprehensively inform patients of relevant risks. Given that many members of a procedural team may be involved in patient positioning, the case indirectly also provides an opportunity to reflect on the importance of communication between and amongst team members where the responsibility for an individual task may be held by many.
Although the defendant in this case was a surgeon, issues of patient positioning are also highly relevant to anaesthesia and intensive care, and provide an opportunity for clinicians working in anaesthesia, intensive care and procedural pain medicine to consider and reflect upon their practice, both with respect to patient positioning and informed consent in a general context. Preventive measures are taken by operating theatre staff to avoid complications as a result of positioning. 
Point of View

SUMMARy
This article discusses the medicolegal implications of a recent judgment in relation to a patient who suffered significant morbidity as a result of patient positioning during an operative procedure. The patient developed an unexpected serious complication following surgery, in the context of a preoperative consent that did not cover every potential complication or contingency. The court held that the failure to warn of a particular risk that would have prevented the patient from undergoing a procedure but did not occur will not necessarily result in a finding of negligence in relation to another risk where the harm did occur. This finding is well aligned to current clinical practice and at the same time does not abrogate the practitioner's duty to provide a comprehensive list of possible complications during the consent process for any proceduralist. In the context of a procedure requiring anaesthesia, the importance of communication and understanding between the anaesthetist and proceduralist as to which aspects of the consent process are undertaken by whom, and to ensure the process is done comprehensively, is of great importance and is indirectly highlighted by this recent judgment. Peripheral nerve injuries are well described in patients undergoing procedures that require periods of immobility under anaesthesia 1 . Common examples include positional brachial plexopathy 2 and meralgia paraesthetica, the latter following prone positioning 3, 4 .
Less common examples include greater auricular nerve palsy from the 'beach chair' position 5 and facial nerve paralysis following prolonged airway manipulation 6 . Smoking, hypertension and diabetes mellitus are general risk factors for perioperative peripheral nerve injury 7 , as is obesity for patients in the prone position 3 . Femoral nerve neurapraxia results in weakness or paralysis of the quadriceps muscle. This is initially very disabling but usually slowly improves. Many patients may not be specifically informed of these risks prior to providing their consent for treatment.
In the landmark case of Rogers v. Whitaker, decided over two decades ago, it was stated that "the duty of a medical practitioner to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of professional advice and treatment is a single comprehensive duty" 8 . This suggests that when a doctor provides a patient with medical advice with respect to treatment, this advice should be complete so as to satisfy principles of informed consent-the implication being that the provision of only partial or incomplete advice constitutes a failure to adequately gain informed consent as a whole.
This judgment was considered in the recent New South Wales Court of Appeals decision 9 . In this case, an adult male weighing about 120 kilograms sought the opinion of a neurosurgeon with regard to back pain due to lumbar disc prolapse. The pain had worsened in the 12 months prior to the initial consultation at which the patient was suffering from pain without any neurological deficit. Following failure of conservative measures, the patient returned to the neurosurgeon who then "recommended immediate surgery". The patient contended that he provided consent "for a 75 percent chance of success", but not for a "five percent chance of catastrophic paralysis". The neurosurgeon argued that he had informed the patient of the "five percent chance" of catastrophic outcome due to damage to the spinal cord or nerves.
The patient in the case in question underwent a six-hour L4/L5 posterior lumbar interbody fusion and awoke with "extreme pain and paralysis in both legs". The patient returned to theatre the following morning for exploration, where no surgical cause was found. He was ultimately diagnosed with bilateral femoral nerve neurapraxia, secondary to the significant period spent in the prone position.
At trial, the patient remained an "incomplete paraplegic" 9 . The patient claimed ongoing severe pain and paraesthesiae in his back and lower limbs, and that he had been bed-bound for a period of several months following the operation, requiring inpatient rehabilitation. Following rehabilitation, he claimed to be limited to be ambulating only with the assistance of a walking frame. Neither the diagnosis nor the patient's current symptoms were in dispute.
Initially, the case was heard in the New South Wales Supreme Court 10 . The judge found that the neurosurgeon was in breach of his duty of care in failing to warn the patient of the risk of bilateral femoral neurapraxia, and that the patient suffered an injury as a result of the procedure. The neurosurgeon was not, however, found liable as it could not be established that the patient would not have proceeded with the operation were he warned about this risk, hence causation was not established. Whilst not explicitly defined, catastrophic risk from a medical perspective in this case might arise from a complication such as spinal canal haematoma causing paraplegia due to spinal cord compression, or transection of a spinal nerve root. The Court did not make a finding as to whether the patient had been warned about a risk of catastrophic paralysis, as this was not deemed relevant to the causation of the injury that had transpired. Thus causation, a necessary legal element to establish an act of negligence, could not be established between the neurosurgeon's breach of duty and the patient's harm.
On appeal in the New South Wales Court of Appeals, the patient's counsel cited Rogers v. Whitaker and contended that warning of the risk of neurapraxia as well as catastrophic paralysis fell within a single duty of care, even though the latter had not eventuated, and that, had the patient known of the risk of catastrophic paralysis, he would have deferred or refused the operation. This appeal was ultimately dismissed and the Court held that the failure to warn of a particular risk that would have prevented the patient from undergoing surgery but did not occur will not necessarily result in a finding of negligence in relation to another risk where harm did occur. The Court made the distinction that the bilateral femoral nerve neurapraxia was not the same as catastrophic paralysis and thus a separate risk.
This case highlights points relevant to all practitioners. First, the principle established in Rogers v. Whitaker with respect to the requirement for consent in the context of material risks inherent in proposed treatment is still very much a legal requirement of clinical practice. Where this case is most relevant is in the apparent re-interpretation of Rogers v. Whitaker in that the "comprehensive duty" pertains to both the provision of accurate and relevant information to the patient, as well as providing treatment with skill and care, and that failing in one aspect but not the other can still lead to a finding of negligence when harm has arisen. This case is relevant to all Australian proceduralists as the Court found that the surgeon in question had failed to warn the patient of a particular risk and an unrelated harm had arisen, which previously may have led to a finding of negligence (as the "single comprehensive duty" has thus been breached) but ultimately did not.
Given the morbidity the patient was experiencing preoperatively and the Court's finding of his willingness to accept a magnitude of risk similar to the magnitude of risk for the injury that ultimately resulted, it is not necessarily surprising that causation could not be established. It must be noted that the initial trial may well have been decided differently if alternative treatments were available for the patient's condition, or if the patient could not accept any degree of risk such that he would have refused surgery despite morbidity or mortality.
From a clinical perspective, it is impossible to present a patient with all possible risks arising both directly and indirectly from a procedure. This is an area of law that is often in conflict with the application of clinical practice. In the case described, it is very difficult to criticise the surgeon's actions at any stage from the perspective of clinical competence. It does, however, seem prudent to recommend that surgeons consider risks beyond those of the surgery and that proceduralists consider risks beyond those of a catheter or endoscope. Such risks might arise as a result not only of preoperative patient position, but also for any number of clinical events that a patient would not otherwise be exposed to if a surgeon or proceduralist did not operate.
Informed consent requires diligent communication between proceduralist and anaesthetist prior to undertaking a procedure to ensure that the consent process is covered as comprehensively as possible. In particular, a strong understanding between clinicians should be sought with respect to which risks are the responsibility of which clinician to discuss with the patient. For instance, in the context of patient positioning, which is a responsibility many would argue is held by both the anaesthetist and the proceduralist, if a complication occurs for which causation can be established, the question arises as to whether the court might find the surgeon or proceduralist liable in these circumstances. On face value it is likely to be the proceduralist undertaking treatment who is responsible for consent, but whether that duty can or should be delegated to other clinical team members, and whether liability is similarly passed on, raises a number of potential issues for reflection. These questions were not addressed by the courts in the case described and are worth considering in any process of obtaining consent.
The plaintiff further appealed to the High Court of Australia 11 . The High Court dismissed the appeal in May 2013, finding that it was not appropriate for the neurosurgeon's liability to extend to the patient's injury. The High Court held that:
...to fail to warn the patient of one risk while informing the patient of another may still… expose the patient to a level of risk of physical injury occurring that is unacceptable to the patient. But the risk of physical injury… in such a case is not necessarily the risk of physical injury that is unacceptable to the patient 11 .
The distinct nature of the risks of neurapraxia and paralysis in this case and the willingness of the patient to accept the risk of neurological deficit combined in the High Court's opinion to support the decision that any failure of the neurosurgeon to warn the patient of the risk of paralysis could not be the legal cause of the neurapraxia that occurred 11 . In the authors' opinion, this is law well applied. Were it decided otherwise, obtaining informed consent would be an increasingly difficult task for clinicians.
The judgment shows a considered legal approach, which stands well with current clinical practice. It goes to the primary purpose of the informed consent process, which is to protect patients' interests and promote their autonomy in determining what is or isn't done to their own bodies. Medical practitioners still have a duty of care to discuss the full range of material risks with their patients, particularly if the risks might have a significant adverse effect on the patient and possibly dissuade the patient from proceeding with the treatment. In the context of providing consent, not just for patient positioning, but for all risks where the responsibility may overlap in a team, proceduralists, anaesthetists and other relevant team members should have a mutual understanding of their roles and clearly communicate how and by whom this consent process is to be undertaken preoperatively.
